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Abstract
This article is the posthumous publication of a fundamental work of the late genius M.U. Newtral. Little is known
of his life, upbringing, education and his golf handicap. Whether he enjoyed flyfishing is still a matter of scientific
controversy. From his style of writing and the locations where his manuscripts were discovered one might conclude
that he spent a reasonable time of his life in India and the United Kingdom, where he presumably worked under
the influence of many such famous people as Luke Withstone, Rudinch Kipling, Morten Haydagger and, last but
not least, Petula Farnsbath-Wellworth, 31 Rosebud Drive, Eightashgreen, Devonshire (ring and knock thrice to be
admitted). Newtral disappeared under nebulous circumstances somewhere in South-America. Some of his belongings
were discovered by Leumas Reltub on the Island of Erewhon, and the here partially reprinted manuscript was not
discovered by a nihilist. Yet, the editors wish to keep the exact location of the original a secret. Newtral probably
received the impetus for writing his treatise upon the following occasion.
In his 2011 paper on “Constructions Around Partialities” Gunther Schmidt discussed a partiality of quite unique
character. It is known as the smallest part or piece of a whole, and it is unique in the way that it seems there is
only exactly one instance and interpretation of it: nothing. When the editors became involved in the production of a
Festschrift for Gunther Schmidt they decided to finally publish Newtral’s work, which happened to have been in their
hands for quite some time without them knowing what to do with it, as a tribute to Gunther in the hope that it will
further or at least subtract nothing from the growth of relational mathematics. The original manuscript (partially
handwritten) has been typeset with greatest care; so for all the mistakes, only M.U. Newtral himself is to blame.
Helpful comments by R. Berghammer, P. Ho¨fner and M. Winter are gratefully acknowledged.
O. Introduction
[...] however, the question coming to mind of a mathematician, when it comes down to sharing things
among friends, is whether nothing actually is some-thing or if it is not. Or, if nothing is not, anyway. Or,
finally, if no-thing is not nothing but not something, either.
By x, we shall refer to an arbitrary thing that lives (or is) within our world W . For example, x could be
an apple. x could also be a heap of apples. But could x be no-thing, nothing, or does the usage of x imply
that it is something?
Since we all did our homework, we shall keep in mind that there might be a few traps there. But these
are traps that we can carelessly yet safely neglect for now since we care for nothing. And, also, since we
want to make a point here, the question of whether having not-a-point or not having a point is anything
but pointless.
[Obviously, as we shall see later on, Newtral was an impressively literate person. For this reason it seems
quite astounding that, especially in questions concerning apples and bags thereof, he did not refer to the
problem of types as it has been thoroughly studied in the last century. The reason is unknown to the
editors—it is hard to believe that Newtral did not know about it. The only thing we can imagine is that
this paradox has been dealt with on the 357 pages that were attached to this manuscript. Another, although
not as obvious explanation, could be that it appears irrelevant to him to assign a type to nothing. In the
Newtral research community it is currently discussed whether the colloquial term “nope” actually was
introduced by Newtral to denote “ no-thing-type”. —The editors.
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| {{}} |. Foundations
... in which we discover the perils of playing with knives and apples.
By /, we shall denote the operation of slashing. Let x be an apple. We slash an apple and get
one piece a and another piece b.
Obviously, the apple has been divided into two parts and no part intersects with the other and, using a
reverse operation (\, “glue”) would yield the original apple x = a\b (and no more and no less). Also, a is
what remains when slashing b away from x and vice versa: a = x/b and b = x/a. At the same time, slashing
an apple results in
one piece a and another piece b and no-thing c else.
This means that slashing an apple delivers three things: the first piece, the second piece, and one piece that
is-not-there.
Let us now put a and b on a balance. Of course, the added weights result in the weight of the entire apple
x. Supposing an ideal cut and denoting the weight of an object by | · |, we have |a| + |b| = |x|. Again, we
also have |a|+ |b| = |x| = |a|+ |b|+ |c| = |x|+ |c|. Obviously, there appears to be no difference whether an
apple is slashed into two or three pieces. Good to know if you are expecting a dozen of guests for dinner and
you have only one apple in your fridge. On the other hand: You don’t have to slash something at all to get
nothing from it. (Good to know, if you don’t even have an apple in your fridge with your friends showing
up unannounced). Also, we derive a very important lemma from this observation:
Nothing is for free.
Let x be a bag containing n apples a1, . . . , an. Obviously, we have n + 1 objects, where n objects reside in
the (n+ 1)-st one. We slash the bag carefully (without slashing any apples in that process). We get: a heap
of n apples on the floor and two torn pieces of cloth. So one bag became two non-bags y1 and y2, and n
apples. Does this make n+ 2 or n things? Let us try the scales experiment:
|x|+
∑
i∈n
|ai| = |y1|+ |y2|+
∑
i∈n
|ai|
But since neither y1 and y2 are bags, they are no-bags. They are not bags. Somehow, the bag disappeared.
And if something is-not, how can it be of any mass? Therefore, y1 and y2 have no bag-weight:
|x| − |y1| = |x| = |x| − |y2| which requires that |y1| = |y2|.
So if the two parts of the bag had a weight then they would have the same weight—which means that there
can’t be slashes that separate a bag into two pieces of different weight. On our table we now have objects
that in sum have the weight
|x|+
∑
i∈n
|ai| = |y1|+ |y2|+
∑
i∈n
|ai| = 2|y2|+
∑
i∈n
|ai| =
∑
i∈n
|ai|.
So while we first got one bag, we now have 0 + 0 = 0 bags plus apples
a1, a2, . . . , an
which gives n things plus two pieces of cloth (and no bag). This result supports the intuitive solution that
comes to mind when wondering about the fact that any cut through a bag always results in two pieces of
same weight: It is hardly ever the case that we can evenly cut any object into exactly similar (volume, weight
or taste) pieces. In the case of the bags the immediate consequence is the following corollary:
Bags have no weight.
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The interesting thing is that if the bag was empty, we are left with two pieces—which seems perfectly
all right: slashing something results in more things. But if we now take the two non-bags and slash each of
them again, we get an arbitrary number of pieces (theoretically) but not a single bag.
We conclude: Under certain, wise circumstances (preservation of things and least effort Ockham-razors)
slashing turns out to be monotone and idempotent. Together, it means that slashing is rather pointless: we
can cut as often as we want or we can not cut as often as we want—we always yield something: nothing.
But somehow, there ought to be a difference about not cutting something or cutting off nothing from
something. Otherwise, we’d all be living a life of ease without worrying that nothing might be a not big
enough piece of something.
| {{} , {{}}} |. Section 3
... which rather should be called “Section Naught”.
Talking about apples does not require the existence of apples—all it takes is to have a symbol or word
or sign that we agree upon to denote (the idea of) an apple. So if we agree that a denotes an apple, “a is
rotten” is a proposition that we can work with.
Since actual existence (whatever that may be) is not required, we can talk about things that are not
there—as long as we can name them.1 It seems perfectly alright to assume there are many no-things out
there (there is neither Santa nor a unicorn but there are No-Santa and No-Unicorn). But why do we only
speak of “nothing” instead of “nothings”? Is it that not-being is some kind of unique property that makes
No-Santa the same as No-Unicorn?
Obviously, the term “nothing” also denotes a generalisation over all those things that share the common
property of not being there. That makes “nothing” also the set of all “nothings”. Which in turn means that
“nothings” are not there. The immediate and infallible consequence would be that there are no nothings!
No apples
Counting is a useful measure for things or no-things. An apple and a pear together in a bag {} make two
things in the bag:
| {a, p} | = 2
Not adding anything else to this set of things leaves the set unchanged and thus its cardinality, too. Adding
nothing to this set means to put something non-existent into the bag, for example the present king k of
France:2
|putinto(k, {a, b})| = | {a, b, k} |
=
ß
3, if the thing referred to by k exists
2, if the thing referred to by k does not exist
This is somehow unsatisfactory: repeatedly putting things into the bag (may they exist or not) results in
a repeated (and exponentially growing!) number of possible of cardinalities that we can only resolve by
checking for the very existence of every thing that we put into the bag.
1One scary corollary is that any name therefore denotes something: either something that is or something that isn’t. But it
means that any sentence of correct grammatical structure becomes a “meaningful” sentence, since we can assume any word in
it to be grounded in the real world. Colorless green ideas sleep furiously!
2We make a very important assumption here: Either a thing is in a bag or it is not: We cannot put something into a set
if it’s already in there. Schro¨dinger’s cat is not both in the set of living things and not. It is just that Schro¨dingers cat and
Not-Schro¨dingers-cat are in both the sets of living things and not-living things—until one finds out that either the living cat
exists or the dead one.
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We could try a trick: put everything into an empty bag of its own before putting it into the larger bag:
|putinto(putinto(k, {}), {a, b})| = |putinto({k} , {a, b})|
= | {a, b, {k}} |
= 3
The problem is: What is in {}? What does “empty” mean? Either, there exist no things that are in this bag.
But again, there is a thing (e.g. ”foob”, see footnote 3). To be precise, there are as many non-existent things
as we can find non-equivalent names for them. Or, since we agreed that “nothing” is a generic concept (i.e. a
bag of all nothings...), the empty bag is the bag that contains the bag containing all nothings. Which in
turn makes the empty bag not really empty. The next method would be to deconstruct an empty bag from
an arbitrary bag by taking away from it everything that is in it. This appears to be a pretty nice method:
We can take away things that exist and we can also take away things that do not exist. We cannot take
away anything from an empty bag, which is good, too, as it leaves us with a fixed point: an empty bag
from which, when we try take anything away from it, remains an empty bag. As an example, removing all
barbers from the bag containing all barbers that do not shave themselves simply results in the empty bag.
This could have saved Profs. Ruse-Sell and Blackfoot many sleepless nights.
Interlude: a or b or neither and {F |K|M} oo
Yet, there is a big problem: Consider the bag
{a, b} .
What does it mean to take away b? Or, what is left after we took away b?3 There are two possible answers:
takeaway(b, {a, b}) =
ß {a} , if removal implies non-existence
{a, } , if removal implies disappearance. (1)
But what happens if we want to take away something that is not in there—may it exist or not? The dual
method is to postulate that an empty bag is a bag where no-one ever has put anything into it. It requires
us to postulate that all bags are initially empty.
In order to avoid confusion for the remainder of the paper, we shall use the following terms: For any set
x, we say that koo(x) is true, iff x is empty:
koo(x) = 1 :⇐⇒ x = {} . (2)
In other words, “koo” denotes the unique property of empty sets and is called “emptiness”.
In contrast to this, “moo” is a property of things that do not exist. A thing is “moo”, if it is not there—yet
we can speak of it as we can name it:
moo(x) = 1 :⇐⇒ |putinto(x, y)| = |y| (3)
Mooish things do not exist, but they do well exist in our universe of reference. They all are “no-things” and
the property they share is no-thingness.
Finally, “foo” is a function that for a given thing x delivers its counterpart: for an existing thing x it
delivers it’s mooish version and vice versa:
foo(x) :←→
ß
x′ with moo(x) = 1, if moo(x) = 0
x′ with moo(x) = 0, if moo(x) = 1 (4)
3To avoid confusion please recall that “,” is just a syntactical means to distinguish one thing ab from two things a, b.
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From our definitions it follows immediately that
|Koo| = | {x : koo(x) = 1} | = | {{}} | = 1 (5)
|Moo| = | {x : moo(x) = 1} | =∞ (6)
|Foos| = | {x : ∀x : x ∈ s −→ foo(x)} | =∞. (7)
This means that there is exactly one empty set in our world: there is something that we call empty and
there is only one such thing. From this we gain the definition of “1”: it is the property of all sets that have
the same number of elements as the set Koo. It also gives us an idea of the meaning of “∞”: it is the number
of elements of a set that remains the same when putting something (truly) additional into it. Since there is
just one thing of which we know that it exists (namely {} and moo({}) /∈ Moo), and since the bag containing
all such things therefore has exactly one element (Koo), we can safely put it into add it to the set thereby
increasing its cardinality by 1:
∞+ 1 = ∞ (8)
[We spent a lot of research to resolve the question whether there is a corresponding boo. It was when we
discovered that a Japanese Kanji writing of “Moo” is pronounced “Boo” in some Chinese dialects (but
also as “Woo”) that we wondered why Newtral chose these function and set names. The Kanji symbol for
“Moo” (or Boo or Woo) itself has, surprisingly, the meaning of “nothing” or a “negligible set of things”.
The fact that “Foo” and “Koo” phonetically resemble the meanings of a negating prefix (“non-...”) and
void or vacuum is, of course, pure incident.—The editors.]
Between [−∞, 3] and [3,∞].
Nothing is what is contained in Koo. This is what reminds us of the definition of a hole:
A hole is nothing with something around it.
Nothing is trivially written as , and something around (and enclosing) it means (to draw) something
around it (i.e., something around ). Traditionally, in a nicely curved and rounded style, this is
depicted as 0 rather than . This is perfectly right since 0 is a symbol that we talk about and,
therefore it is there—no matter whether its meaning actually exists (moo(0) = 1 or moo(0) = 0 both imply
the existence of their counterparts foo(0) = 0′.) This, finally, justifies the notation of
{}
as a hole and therefore the set with nothing in it.4
The symbol “0” is commonly pronounced as “zero”, sometimes also as “nil” or “nul” or “naught”.
Whether this explains the common sense meaning of the adjective “naughty” for a wicked problem arising
from talking about nothing or making much ado about nothing (i.e. common sense romantic naughtiness)
is left as an exercise for the interested reader.
NULL is also used as a name for a pointer into the void where a pointer is nothing else than the interpre-
tation of the value of a value: the assignment
p=NULL;
means that henceforth p means nothing: evaluating the pointer (i.e. referring to the object to which it points
to) yields , which, in turn is written as “0”; in other words, p is now a pointless pointer. NIL also
denotes the empty list of things:5.
[ ] = ( ) .
Clearly, | [ ] | = | [ ] | = 0, but is [ ] = [ ]?
4An interesting point beyond the scope of this article is how to measure different kinds of holes. Undoubtedly, there are
small holes, big holes, deep holes and shallow ones, or even black holes. One might, for example, ask, whether a big hole is just
the same as a small hole with less around or whether a small hole is a big hole with less nothing or even less than nothing in it.
5Both in Prolog and LISP notation.
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Foor. Talking about “”
The word “zero” has an interesting etymology: It originates from “zefiro”. It was one of Fibonacci’s great
accomplishments that he brought nothing with him from Africa, where he was raised in his early childhood:
“zefiro” is just the medieval attempt of using an already known word meaning “a wind blowing from the
west” whose pronunciation came closest to the Arabic word for just nothing (transliterated “sfr”). First, it
is noteworthy that the west wind is dominant for the spring climate in the Mediterranean and that it is the
wind of least force bringing about the blooming and, hence, all life. The wind was called after the Greek
god Zεϕυρoς who, in turn, is known for his rather naught–y lifestyle.
The word (when written sfr) has several meanings according to the various forms it may appear in: As
a noun, it refers to the second month of the lunar calendar which has the property of beginning with new
moon—i.e. the very day on which the calendar itself is based is not present in the sense that it is not visible
and therefore has no sign. It, too, could be written as , since we can’t see it. As a verb, sfr has
several similar meanings with slightly different connotations: “to empty” means to take something out of
something, “to vacate” means to leave, “to (e)vacuate” means to remove everything leaving nothing, i.e. a
void or vacuum as a state of deprivement, and finally, “to free” means to get rid of something. All of these
meanings have their counterparts when constructing the perfect form of the verb: we have the emptied, the
left (over), the evacuated and the freed.
Yet it is not as simple to speak about the void as it is to speak about a hole: The latter is nothing
with something around it, but the former is simply nothing. So evacuating a bottle results in an empty
bottle—but not in a bottle containing a vacuum (for the vacuum does not exist: it is what is inside the
empty set):
woo(x) = 1 :⇐⇒ ∀s : x ∈ s −→ koo(s). (9)
The vacuum, so to say, is the only thing that does not exist, it is a thing that negates existence in the sense
that one cannot even say “there is a vacuum inside the bottle”. It has been evacuated and now there is
nothing left over so there is nothing in it any more so it’s empty. It is interesting to spend another thought
on the meaning of “freedom”: it is the former content of the bottle that is freed from its surroundings. Also,
the volume of the bottle is free from some kind of physical restriction. A bottle of wine is not as much a
bottle as an empty bottle because it is determined by its content whereas an empty bottle is a bottle with
the potential of keeping anything (as long as it fits through the neck and into the volume).
Sfr itself was imported to the African-Arabic world from Asia. In Sanskrit, the adjective sunya means
“nothing”. Its corresponding noun sunyata means emptiness or voidness on the one hand but also describes
ultimate openness or unlimitedness. Now we find two seemingly dual concepts to be covered under one and
the same name. But again, emptiness on the one hand and unlimitedness on the other nicely correspond to
the ideas of vacuum and ultimate freedom.
Sunyata is a fundamental term in Buddhism. Buddhism spread all over asia, first to China and then, via
Korea, to Japan. Over time many flavours emerged but they all share the fundamental concept of nothing.
From many sutras we can learn that we can’t tell the difference between a thing that is not there and a
thing that we can’t perceive. The problem (or rather the problem that causes all the trouble) is that nothing
is just a thing that is not there and even if it were, we couldn’t perceive it. Just look at the following .
Is there a or is it that you just can’t perceive the gap? Either way we seem to be speaking about it, so
it is moo. But if we put into a bag, we have
{ } ?= {} .
Imagine { } = {}. Then, { } ∈ Koo, and, hence, koo({ }) = koo({}). So far, so good, but let us take
a copy of each set and put it into the other one:
A := putinto({} , { }) = { , {}} (10)
B := putinto({ } , {}) = {{ }} (11)
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They do not only look different, they are: Since we do not know anything about the existence of , we do
not know the cardinality of { } (except that it is less than two). Hence the set A may contain 1 or two
elements whereas B contains exactly one element and no more and no less. The only difference is whether
the set contained in B contains something—but that is not the question. The consequence is that gaps like
are something different than gaps which are not there (it is easy to see that 6=). As a result, we
have a contradiction to our initial assumption. We conclude that
{ } 6= {} . (12)
V. Void
So not-being is different from being-nothing: it’s just that we cannot perceive the difference between
an absent being and a (present) not-being. This problem arises from the simple duality inherent to our
understanding of the world: Something is or it is not. Obviously, this is wrong.
Let us now take a look at Foo, Moo and Koo from a philosophical point of view: Just as we described
the difference between the an empty bottle and a bottle of wine regarding their respective potential of
representing the “ideal bottle”, Sunyata interpreted as “emptiness” refers to a state of being or a perceiving
entity, whereas sunya is simply nothing. For an empty mind (or, say, an empty bottle) there is no difference
in not being able to perceive its own content (it contains ) or postulating that there is no-thing in it (it
“contains” a vacuum) or that it does not contain anything (all it contains are moo-ish things).
The problem of discriminating between all these different concepts only arises by the mere attempt to
talk and reason about it.
IIIIX. Independence and relating nothing
We now come to one interesting part that I do hope will be topic of future research as it concerns not only
the very core of mathematics but also every science and, if I might add, the entire life of beings altogether.
It is the question of whether nothing can be related to nothing else and, if so, whether it is the same as not
relating some-things or no-things.
[The author of the manuscript has found posthumous appreciation—even if not directly influenced by his
manuscript as it is presented here, but by the individual research of such great mathematicians as Frank
Harary, Ronald Read and, of course, Gunther Schmidt.—The editors.]
Let us consider two sets A, B and C. Imagine that koo(C) = 1, i.e. C = {}. Similarly, imagine that
A = {a, b, c} with all a, b, c not being moo. And finally, assume that B = {foo(x) : x ∈ A}.
We now consider the relation >A := A×A. Of course, it is the universal relation on A:
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a b c
a 1 1 1
b 1 1 1
c 1 1 1
a

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What does >B = B × B look like? It relates for all x in A the non-existing counterparts foo. It becomes
what is known as a rather pointless argument: It relates nothings and makes a whole lot ado about nothing:
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1

 **MM
II
;; nn
oo
uu
As one can see, the graph of >B is not empty ; it is not koo-ish—it’s just that is seems not to have any
nodes. This is hard to be put into a formula, because G>B = 〈B,>B〉 appears to be
〈{} , {〈〉 , 〈〉 , 〈〉 , 〈〉 , 〈〉 , 〈〉 , 〈〉 , 〈〉}〉 . (13)
Since elements of a set occur only once, this would be the same as
〈{} , {〈〉}〉 . (14)
So, a relation on an empty domain has at least one element! On the other hand, >B is a subset of B × B
and B appears to be quite empty. So how can a set with at least one element in it be a subset of an empty
set? The answer is simple: It can well be, if all the elements do not exist. Therefore, let us formally precisely
redefine >B , and we shall see that all cumbersome side-effects will disappear:
foo(a) foo(b) foo(c)
foo(a) 1 1 1
foo(b) 1 1 1
foo(c) 1 1 1
a′

 ''
b′MM
GG
77 c′ ll
ll
ss
where all x′ ∈ Moo and x′ = foo(x).
Obviously, the graph that we achieve by fooing >B , is isomorphic to the original one, and we even have
that x′R′y′ ⇐⇒ xRy. Also, by using oof := foo˘ we call the result of applying the existential negation foo
the graph Goof . The problem is that by definition of foo and moo, the set Goof contains only non-existing
things which means that B’s cardinality is 0.
To be precise, the according matrix and graph representations then are

}}
MM
jj
::
llpp
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where the wild arrangement of arrows is just to indicate that there are many arrows with unknown domain
and codomain. But still, everyone would agree that this graph is different from the graph
.
Hence, a relation between non-existing things is not necessarily an empty relation.
Let us, finally, consider > C . It is {} × {} and the arrows in there are the arrows connecting x and y for
which koo(x) = koo(y) = 1, i.e. x, y ∈ {}. Trivially, there are no such arrows—and, obviously, {} does not
contain anything either. So its proper graph representation actually is
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.But since > C connects all such entities that are in {} the relation matrix becomes
· · ·
0 · · ·
...
. . .
.
which is a possibly infinite matrix with 0s denoting that nothing is connected to anything but height and
width, since there is just one koo.
We conclude:
GA = 〈A,A×A〉 = 〈{a, b, c} , {〈x, y〉 : x, y ∈ {a, b, c}}〉 (15)
GB = 〈{} , {} × {}〉 = 〈{} , {〈x, y〉 : x, y /∈ A}〉 (16)
GC = 〈{} , {}〉 (17)
Therefore, relating nothing is similar to speaking about nothing: A comes into existence by its naming.
Hence, a relation between nothings is different from all the ways one could relate nothing. So there is a
difference between a graph without nodes, a graph without edges and a graph without both and an empty
graph: The latter one is the “purest” graph in the sense as it does not contain points, no edges and,
most importantly, no intention of relating anything with anything else. The only consequence of this is the
following: The distinction becomes pointless as soon as we do not distinguish between non-existent and
non-perceivable points and the lesson learned is that all those problems are simply a-void-able by not trying
to distinguish.
[With these remarks, Newtral unknowingly also sheds some further light on the notion of an unsharp
relational product, a topic that has been tackled by Gunter Schmidt from various angles: relating nothing to
something that itself is related to nothing seems to be properly more than relating nothing to nothing.—The
editors.]
|World miracles|. Not the end.
... in which we shall deal with nothing
and the question whether this is would be the same
as not dealing with something.
Having an “empty mind” (Mu shin) means to have no self (for the self is just a creation of something
having not an empty mind: “it” starts thinking and as such is able to recognise itself).
Cogito ergo sum
is one common phrase trying to grasp this idea. Another one is that
Being no-one
is the only way to perceive the world as it really is: If we are, there is also some “I” that perceives the
world. However, how should “I” perceive myself without having my perception of myself being influenced
by I’s perception process? Therefore, it is impossible to have a reliable image of the real world unless the
perception is transparent. But then, again, if it really is (absolutely) transparent, it is not perceivable. And
that means, that some “I” would be incapable of perceiving itself. “I” is always deceived by its being. And
a true “I” is there only if it is empty—just as an empty bottle is a true bottle (in contrast to a bottle of
wine (or a bottle of Klein, for which the emptiness problem is even more tricky)).
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Trying to give “I” a meaning means to put some sense into it. This again leads us to two famous western
philosophers: Heidegger and Wittgenstein.
Heidegger stated that “Dasein” is the state of mind of a being that realizes its thrownness into the world.
The only thing one can say for sure about conscious beings is that they know about their existence as a
result of being thrown into the world. From this there follows the fear of being taken away from the world
again—i.e. to die. As an immediate consequence, every such being tries to find some comfort and it does so
by trying to find a sense or reason or justification for its being there. And this is, where, by trying to make life
bearable, all the trouble actually starts: Bottles try to give themselves (among all others) a justification by
holding something, e.g. some wine, and in this process becoming a bottle-of-wine. This is a strong limitation
(and alienation) from a bottle’s true nature as being something that can hold many different things (unless
it is filled).
Wittgenstein made many attempts to understand Human language and its meaning. It would be far
beyond the scope of this small paper to give a satisfying summary. Therefore, we shall just conclude with
one famous quote by him:
The meaning of a word is its use.
So, the meaning of “nothing” is: . And since we cannot speak of nothing without speaking, the story
about nothing better remains untold:
[At this point the original manuscript abruptly ends. However, it continues in the sense that there are
357 more sheets of paper attached. After several years of intensive research, the editors are still unable to
determine whether these pages are empty or whether nothing has been written on them.]
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